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ABSTRACT 
Successful urban regeneration projects generate benefits that are realised over a much longer timeframe than 
normal market developments and benefits well beyond those that can be uplifted by a market developer.  
Consequently there is substantial evidence in the literature that successful place-making and urban regeneration 
projects are usually public-private partnerships and involve a funder, usually local or central government, willing to 
contribute ‘patient’ capital. Following the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes that devastated the centre of Christchurch, 
there was an urgent need to rebuild and revitalise the heart of the city, and increasing the number of people living in or 
near the city centre was seen as a key ingredient of that. In October 2010, an international competition was launched 
to design and build an Urban Village, a project intended to stimulate renewed residential development in the city. The 
competition attracted 58 entrants from around world, and in October 2013 the winning team was chosen from four 
finalists. However the team failed to secure sufficient finance, and in November 2015 the Government announced that 
the development would not proceed. The Government was unwilling or unable to recognise that an insistence on a 
pure market approach would not deliver the innovative sustainable village asked for in the competition brief, and 
failed to factor in the opportunity cost to government, local government, local businesses and the wider Christchurch 
community of delaying by many years the residential development of the eastern side of the city. As a result, the early 
vision of the vitality that a thriving residential neighbourhood would bring to the city has not yet been realised 
Keywords: urban regeneration; Breathe competition; urban village; market approach; ‘patient capital’ earthquake, 
Christchurch 
1. INTRODUCTION  
The earthquakes of September 2010 and 
February 2011 and the many subsequent 
aftershocks badly damaged many buildings in the 
centre of Christchurch, New Zealand. Once the 
buildings that were deemed hazardous or 
irreparable had been demolished, there were 
many city blocks left completely empty. However 
despite the physical and emotional devastation 
the earthquakes had wrought, a new hope began 
to blossom. Yes, the city faced a massive rebuild 
and regeneration challenge, but this was also 
seen as a once in a lifetime opportunity to build 
an exemplary sustainable city fit for the 21st 
century.   
One flagship post-quake urban regeneration 
project was the design-and-build Breathe Urban 
Village competition, named ’Breathe’ to reflect its 
purpose to breathe new life into the central city. 
The competition attracted 58 entrants from 
around the world, and in October 2013 the 
winning team was selected from four finalists. 
However in November 2015, the Government 
announced the development would not proceed. 
This paper reviews how the Breathe 
competition was set up and run, and explores 
some of the factors determining its ultimate 
failure. It is based on confidential interviews with 
three of the competition organisers, two of the 
judges, three of the four finalists, and one city 
councillor, and an analysis of key competition 
documents and of coverage of the project in The 
Press and other media. Some of the documents 
are publicly available (many in the Beacon 
Pathway’s ’Toolkit for Residential Design and 
Build Competitions’1 ), others the author had 
access to as a member of The Viva2 Project , a 
partner in one of the four teams of finalists in the 
competition. 
                                                          
1
www.beaconpathway.co.nz/further-
research/article/a_toolkit_for_residential_design_and_build
_competitions 
2
 http://thevivaproject.org.nz/ 
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While the trigger for the competition was a 
natural disaster, internationally there have been 
many inner city regeneration and ‘brownfield’3  
projects addressing similar challenges - 
uninhabited, sparsely habited or underused 
blocks of land close to the city centre, a desire to 
bring people back to living in the inner city, and 
often problematic ground conditions (e.g. 
contaminated sites in post-industrial brownfield 
projects in Europe and North America, 
liquefaction-prone land in Christchurch). This 
means there is potential to learn from 
international regeneration projects, and since 
financing of the Breathe development proved 
such a critical factor, the paper first examines the 
international experience of how urban 
regeneration is led and funded. The following 
section documents how this competition 
emerged from recovery plans aiming to increase 
the number of people living in the inner city. The 
Breathe Competition is then introduced, and 
some of the factors that emerged as critical to 
the financial viability of the development are 
explored: the price, value and condition of the 
land; the challenge of resolving the tension 
between quality of design and cost; and the 
options the finalists presented to make the 
development financially viable. Finally the 
outcome of the competition is discussed and 
some conclusions. 
2. WHO LEADS AND FUNDS URBAN 
REGENERATION? 
Since the mid 20th century, many European 
and North American cities have experienced 
physical, economic, social and environmental 
decline, and regeneration emerged as a process 
that seeks to reverse the decay, raise value and 
kick-start markets (Adair et al., 2003a). 
Traditionally, such areas of decline have been 
considered by the private sector as zones of risk 
and uncertainty (McNamara, 1993; Adair et al., 
2005) and regeneration projects have therefore 
usually been dependent upon some form of 
public-sector intervention to stimulate market 
activity.  
                                                          
3
 Adams et al. (2010) compared North American and British 
approaches to brownfield development, and note that the 
policy emphasis in the UK is placed not on why land became 
vacant or derelict, but rather on the processes by which it 
might be put to use in future, whereas in the US the term 
brownfield refers to land where expansion or 
redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived 
environmental contamination. 
Successful cities make a critical contribution to 
the competitive performance of the country as a 
whole (Adair et al., 2000), which may explain why 
central governments frequently play a key role in 
funding regeneration projects. For example, in 
the UK, central government has been heavily 
involved in the funding of urban regeneration 
from the 1960s right through to the present day 
(Berkeley et al. 2017).   There is now a wealth of 
research and practical experience internationally 
about the process of successful urban 
regeneration (Roberts et al., 2017). And over 
recent decades there has been increasing 
recognition of the need for partnerships which 
acknowledge the complementary roles of the 
different partners – the role of the private sector 
in terms of stimulating property development 
and investment (Adair et al., 2000), and the 
equally important role of strong democratic local 
leadership, public participation and the use of 
public finance to attract increased private 
investment (Urban Task Force Report 1999). In 
the UK and across Europe, there is an established 
consensus that successful regeneration requires a 
strategically designed, locally or regionally based, 
multi-sector, multi-agency partnership approach 
(Carter & Roberts, 2017)  
In many regeneration projects, local 
leadership is provided by city councils who 
recognise the many economic and social benefits 
to the city and the community of revitalising an 
area and bringing life and employment back into 
the city. In economic terms, this is acknowledging 
that good urban design can create positive 
‘external benefits’ – benefits of an economic, 
social or environmental nature that accrue to the 
wider community and are not fully captured by 
the developer (Carmona et al., 2001).  These 
benefits can include more local employment, 
revitalization of a depressed area, quality of life 
improvements, and increasing rating values 
and/or tax revenue from the project and 
surrounding development (MFE, 2005; 
Leinberger, 2007; Adam and Tiesdell, 2013).  
Much less common internationally are 
successful examples of urban regeneration led 
solely by the private sector. There are a number 
of factors that make developers reluctant to take 
on such projects on their own. Three key factors 
are:  
o Urban regeneration projects are much 
higher risk, tend to cost more and deliver a 
return over a much longer period than 
typical suburban greenfields developments 
Lincoln Planning Review 18  Volume 8, Issue 1-2, December 2017 
(Adair et al., 1999; Adair et al., 2003a; 
Leinberger, 2007; De Sousa, 2008; Trowers 
and Hamlin, 2016); or are perceived by 
developers and their investors as higher 
risk, principally because of an information 
deficit about the returns and risks (Adair et 
al., 2003a, b, c; Adair et al., 2005). 
o The benefits of urban regeneration 
projects are widely spread, and so not all 
easily uplifted by the developer (Carmona 
et al., 2001; MFE, 2005) 
o The methods used by both developers and 
their investors to analyse financial risk are 
not suited to evaluating both the longer 
time horizon of the return and multiple 
sources of value that urban regeneration 
projects generate (Leinberger, 2007; 
Adams and Tiesdell, 2013; Trowers and 
Hamlin, 2016). 
Renewal locations are characterised by a 
perception of market failure (Adair et al. 2003a), 
so regeneration projects that seek to work 
against existing market trends are viewed as 
inherently risky. Indeed Adair et al. (1999) define 
urban regeneration as the process of reversing 
economic, social and physical decay that has 
reached the point where market forces alone will 
not suffice. Residential regeneration projects are 
therefore usually ‘place-making’ exercises that 
effectively seek to use good urban design to 
transform decaying or damaged neighbourhoods 
into vibrant mixed-use inner city neighbourhoods 
that are walkable, accessible, sustainable and 
liveable. If the project does not succeed in quickly 
slowing or reversing the decline, the developer 
and investors face significant financial risk. Even if 
the project does succeed, the benefits will 
accumulate over many decades (Leinberger, 
2007), and so a developer who exits early will not 
share in any uplift in property value that takes 
place once the build-out period is complete - 
these are enjoyed by subsequent owners 
(Trowers and Hamlin 2016).  Likewise many of 
the benefits of regeneration spill over into 
neighbouring areas, to the benefit of 
neighbouring property owners. The temptation 
for developers therefore is to maximise short-
term gains and not to invest in features that can 
produce longer-term benefits (Trowers and 
Hamlin 2016). 
Gyourko and Rybczynski (2001) and 
Leinberger (2007) argue that ‘walkable’ mixed-
use urban areas, i.e. areas where most and 
possibly all of life’s daily needs (shopping, 
recreation, school, restaurants, employment, 
etc.) are reachable on foot or by transit, tend to 
cost more upfront due to a range of factors. 
These can include higher inner city land prices, 
higher construction costs (multi-story cf. single 
story), and the presence of multiple uses, or 
multiple types of a given product (e.g. a mixture 
of apartments, detached houses and row houses) 
which mean that the scale economies associated 
with mass-producing a single product often 
cannot be realized (Gyourko and Rybczynski, 
2001; Leinberger, 2007). Such developments can 
also be more costly to finance because 
developers and financiers lack experience with 
‘non-conforming’ mixed-use and/or high density, 
walkable projects, compared with suburban 
developments that have a known market and a 
commoditised product that developers and their 
financiers are familiar with (Leinberger, 2007) 
and perceive that their greater complexity 
increases risk (Gyourko and Rybczynski, 2001). 
In contrast to a suburban greenfields 
development, where most of the capital return is 
reaped by the developer within the first seven 
years, urban regeneration projects tend to accrue 
value initially more slowly, but over a 10-20 year 
time span are much more valuable, and therefore 
long term investors in such projects are likely to 
see substantial financial returns as the project 
matures (Leinberger, 2007).  However the tools 
used to evaluate equity investments in 
construction projects (such as discounted cash 
flow and internal rate of return) are appropriate 
for short-term (one to seven years) investment 
decisions, but are less able to evaluate mid- to 
long-term returns (beyond year five), which is 
when a walkable development has the strongest 
financial performance (Leinberger, 2007).  
Developers may thus tend to emphasise short-
run returns and curtail costs, whereas the 
community may favour a durable yet flexible 
outcome that provides lasting utility (MFE, 2005). 
Carmona et al. (2001, p.15) describe this as 
commercial pressures militating against long-
term investment in design quality. Left to their 
own devices, real estate markets tend to induce 
disintegrated behaviour and create disintegrated 
places (Adams and Tiesdell 2013), and the result 
will be poorer urban design than is socially 
optimal (MFE, 2005).  
The usual solution to this problem is to seek to 
de-risk the project for potential developers by 
contributing public funds, from either local or 
central governments, in recognition of the many 
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benefits that accrue from urban regeneration and 
good urban design. Leinberger (2007) however, 
focuses not on the public/private split, but on the 
short term/long term focus of the investors. He 
argues that the key need is for ‘patient equity’ – 
equity from investors that are willing to leave 
their money in a project over a period of years. 
While this patient capital most often comes from 
central or local government, it does occasionally 
come from the developer him- or herself, or from 
pension funds and other institutional investors, 
individual investors or non-profits (Leinberger, 
2007). Deeg and Hardie (2016) have developed a 
framework to assess the continuum of investor 
patience, from hedge funds, actively managed 
funds and most banks at the impatient end, to 
passive funds, families/foundations, sovereign 
wealth funds, pension funds, life insurance and 
some individuals and angel investors towards the 
more patient end. 
One development that would make it easier 
for developers to access both private and public 
sources of patient capital would be better 
methods of evaluating the value of such projects. 
The market is good at establishing a monetary 
‘exchange value’ for a development, but market 
prices are poor indicators of the value of many 
collective benefits, for example social value, 
aesthetic value and other non-market concepts 
of worth, since their key feature consists of 
externalities which are not taken into account in 
the price for which the goods are sold (Carmona 
et al. 2001). Tyler et al. (2010) were 
commissioned by the UK Government to develop 
a methodology to assess the benefits and value 
for money of government interventions in 
regeneration. Using available UK data, they 
concluded that regeneration projects that 
involved acquisition, demolition and new build 
delivered a benefit/cost ratio of 5.5 (central 
valuation) or 3.7 (cautious valuation), while new 
build housing regeneration projects delivered a 
benefit/cost ratio of 2.6 (central valuation) or 1.7 
(cautious valuation) (Tyler et al., 2010)4. The 
difficulty of assessing the potential value of 
regeneration projects is also addressed in a 
recent report titled ‘Highly Valued, Hard to Value’ 
(Trowers and Hamlin, 2016). The authors 
explored the range of attributes that characterize 
                                                          
4
In developing the estimate, the authors assumed the 
benefits would take some time to emerge, say three 
years, but that they would then persist for 30 years 
(Tyler et al., 2010, p.87).  
successful regeneration projects (i.e. projects 
which create attractive and well-designed places, 
that people and businesses want to live in and 
trade from and that produce positive financial 
rewards for promoters and developers), and 
identified valuation techniques that can capture 
some of these attributes that are not fully 
reflected in market prices. 
3. HOW TO ENCOURAGE MORE PEOPLE TO 
LIVE IN INNER CITY CHRISTCHURCH  
Even before the earthquakes, there had been 
strong interest from Christchurch City Council 
(CCC) and local business groups in increasing the 
number of people living in or near the city centre, 
as a way to energise and revitalise the inner city. 
Inner city residents provide increased custom to 
inner city businesses, but also having more 
people living, shopping and moving about the 
inner city simply makes the city feel more vibrant 
and alive. Following the widespread devastation 
caused by the earthquakes, the focus shifted very 
rapidly to how to rebuild the city, and the need to 
increase the number of people living within the 
‘four Avenues’ (Moorhouse, Fitzgerald, Bealey 
and Rolleston) was an early refrain. 
The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 
required the development of a draft Recovery 
Plan for the central business district (CBD) within 
9 months of the Act coming into force on 18 April 
2011, and specified that Christchurch City Council 
should lead that development (Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery Act 2011, clause 17). 
Accordingly by December 2011, the Council had 
prepared a Central City Plan Draft Central City 
Recovery Plan for Ministerial Approval (CCRP, 
2011). This plan drew strongly on the submissions 
to ‘Share an Idea’, the strongly supported public 
consultation process organised by CCC in May 
2011. 
The plan acknowledged the importance for 
the city’s vitality and the viability of inner city 
businesses of having more people living in the 
inner city. Under the heading City Life, the plan 
stated that ’For the Central City’s recovery to be 
successful, it requires a significant residential 
population to support business growth and 
development, and create a high level of activity 
and vibrancy’ (CCRP, 2011 p.100), and sets out a 
goal of having 10,000 households including 
families living in the central city by 2030 (up from 
7700 residents pre-quake). The plan recognized 
that quite a lot would need to change for the 
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inner city to become ‘a great place to live’ and set 
out some of the attributes that people are 
looking for. These include neighbourhoods that 
have a sense of identity, provide a choice of living 
environments and enable residents to enjoy and 
be part of a great community atmosphere; and 
greater choice of housing within financial reach 
of people in all stages and ages of life, from one-
bedroom units through to multiple bedroom 
family houses to attract a diverse range of 
residents, including families who seek safe 
environments in which to raise their children. 
’Different housing styles will be crucial to cater 
for different needs and homes may include 
gardens or balconies, private or communal 
garden space and no residential parking’. (CCRP, 
2011, p.100).  
The plan was realistic in recognizing that these 
changes were unlikely to occur left to the market 
alone, and announced the Council’s intention to 
‘work with partners to lead by example to 
demonstrate what is possible’ (CCRP, 2011, 
p100). The plan outlines ’a package of initiatives 
and incentives to establish new living choices and 
create great neighbourhoods. The package is 
designed to ensure that living in the Central City 
is an option for everyone’ (CCRP, 2011, p.100). 
These included residential incentives, social 
housing, affordable housing, neighbourhood 
initiatives, and a housing showcase, with a total 
budget allocated of $35.7million. 
The aim of the residential incentives package 
was to make ‘the Central City an affordable 
choice for everyone’ and get more people living 
in and enjoying life in the redeveloped Central 
City. The plan also envisaged a tool to raise the 
quality of the rebuild, in terms of both 
environmental and social sustainability and 
aesthetics, by linking incentives to meeting 
quality design criteria, and targeting the 
assistance to areas of the Central City where the 
greatest opportunities for creating new 
communities exist. The proposed incentives 
included both a Development Contributions 
rebate and a Central City Home Buyers Assistance 
Incentive. 
One initiative introduced in the Council’s CCRP 
was a Housing Showcase. The Housing Showcase 
initiative was designed to create a new mixed-
use, thriving inner-city neighbourhood displaying 
medium density homes, based on sustainable 
design principles. Because its chief purpose was 
to influence other developments, the plan set out 
the Council’s intention to develop it early in the 
redevelopment process (2012-13) (CCRP, 2011 
p.102).  Implementation of the showcase was to 
involve ’a collaborative partnership between the 
Council, private industry and central government 
agencies, with the Council taking a leadership and 
facilitation role in the delivery of this project. A 
design competition will initiate the project and 
promote a mix of building designs, construction 
materials and methods all underpinned by 
sustainable and affordable design principles. The 
Council will consider establishing a number of 
housing showcases if the opportunity arises’. 
(CCRP, 2011 p.102).   
The CCC Central City Recovery Plan was 
submitted to the Minister for Earthquake 
Recovery, Gerry Brownlee, in December 2011. 
Over the following months the ’Minister 
reviewed the Council's draft Recovery Plan, 
taking into account its impact, effect and funding 
implications, and came to the view that it could 
not be approved without amendment. In 
particular, there was insufficient information in 
the draft on how the Recovery Plan would be 
implemented and it proposed changes to the 
District Plan that were considered unnecessarily 
complex’5. 
The Minister established a special unit within 
the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority 
(CERA), namely the Christchurch Central 
Development Unit (CCDU), and this group, 
working in close collaboration with the Council, 
Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu and other key 
stakeholders, led the creation of a revised plan, 
the Christchurch Central Recovery Plan. This plan 
contained within it a Blueprint Plan, a spatial 
framework for central Christchurch which 
’describes the form in which the central city can 
be rebuilt as a whole, and defines the locations of 
‘anchor’ projects, which will stimulate further 
development’ (CCRP, 2012, p.33). This overview 
plan was published in July 2012, but the details 
concerning the residential sector emerged much 
later, in March 2014, in the chapter of the 
Recovery Plan entitled ’A Liveable City, Draft for 
public written comment’6.  
One of the anchor projects identified in the 
Blueprint was a Residential Demonstration 
Project, carrying through the Housing Showcase 
                                                          
5
www.ccc.govt.nz/the-council/plans-strategies-
policies-and-bylaws/plans/central-city-recovery-plan  
6
http://ceraarchive.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default 
/files/Documents/christchurch-central-recovery-plan-
draft-residential-chapter-16-july-2014.pdf 
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idea in the earlier city council plan. A specific 
location for the Residential Demonstration 
Project was identified in the Blueprint, in an area 
to the north of Latimer Square (CCRP, 2012, p81-
82), on a block of land at that stage not owned by 
the Crown. At that time (and still now), the 
chosen block was bordered to the east by a run 
down neighbourhood possibly also in need of 
regeneration, and to the west and south beyond 
Latimer Square by the cleared empty blocks 
designated in the Blueprint as ‘the East Frame’7.   
The idea of kickstarting this development with 
a competition was not mentioned in the 
Blueprint, and unlike the CCC plan which had the 
Council taking a leadership and facilitation role in 
the delivery of the project, the lead agency was 
designated as the private sector, with CERA, CCC, 
Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment 
(MBIE) and Housing NZ Corporation nominated as 
partners.   
4. BREATHE URBAN VILLAGE COMPETITION  
In October 2012, an international competition 
was launched to design and build an Urban 
Village on this site. The competition brief was ’to 
create an exemplar central city neighbourhood 
displaying medium density homes, based on 
sustainable design principles, to inspire and 
shape modern urban living in Christchurch’. 
The competition was unusual in that rather 
than being simply a design competition, with the 
inherent risk that designs would be submitted 
that were beautiful but unbuildable for financial 
or other reasons, the competition required 
entrants to form a multi-disciplinary team that 
would be capable of buying the land and 
developing the design on the designated site. 
The competition brief sets out the conditions 
for the competition, and identifies the organisers, 
partners and the judges. The organisers are 
named as the Ministry of Business, Innovation 
and Employment (MBIE), CCC, CERA/ 
Christchurch Development Unit (CCDU) and Ngāi 
                                                          
7
As at December 2017, the East Frame is still 
uninhabited, but Otakaro has stated it will complete 
the park to run down the centre of the block by 
Christmas (www.otakaroltd.co.nz/news/new-back-
yard-launched-for-christchurch/ ), and the framing has 
just gone up for the for the first 20 homes (of the 
planned 900) at the south end of the block  
www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/news/99221831/east-
frame-apartments-start-taking-shape-in-central-
christchurch  
Tahu, and the project sponsors as Cement and 
Concrete Association of NZ, NZ Steel, the Energy 
Efficiency and Conservation Authority (EECA), and 
Building Research Association of NZ. Beacon 
Pathway, the NZ Institute of Architects and NZ 
Institute of Landscape Architects are named as 
Project Supporters. The judging panel was led by 
Wellington-based architect Stuart Gardyne, and 
the other members were Kevin McCloud (UK 
Grand Designs), developer Martin Udale, 
landscape architect Di Lucas, engineer Kevin 
Simcock, Ngāi Tahu architect Huia Reriti and 
youth leader Zea Harman. 
The competition attracted 58 entries from 
fifteen countries, including New Zealand, 
Australia, the United States, Europe, Egypt, 
Japan, China, Iran, India, and Indonesia. The 
entries showed amazing variety and creativity 
and prompted descriptions such as exciting, 
quirky, edgy, fascinating, fantastical, elegant, 
harmonious, and hobbit-like8, and in March 2013 
a length of Worcester Boulevard was given over 
to display for the public9 the top 22 entries10.  
Four finalists were selected for Stage 2 and 
asked to prepare more detailed plans. The 
finalists were Roger Walker, of Walker 
Architecture and Design, Wellington, with Ceres 
NZ Development; Jasmax architects, the Viva 
Project, Evergreen Realty and Latitude Group 
Development; Ganellen, the University of 
Technology Sydney and Design King Company 
Architects, of Australia; Anselmi Attiani 
Associated Architects & Cresco Group (Italy) and 
Holloway Builders (NZ)11. In October 2013, the 
Anselmi Attiani/Cresco/Holloway team was 
selected as the winner, and they indicated they 
expected construction would begin mid-201412.  
The key Government contribution to the 
project was the purchase by CERA of the parcels 
of land comprising the Breathe site (including 
part of Gressons Lane which previously ran across 
the centre of the site), and consolidation of them 
                                                          
8
www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/opinion/8386630 
/Grace-chaos-in-urban-village-designs 
9
www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/business/the-
rebuild/8367049/Urban-Village-project-finalists-
chosen  Georgina Stylianou, Mar 02 2013 
10
http://thevivaproject.org.nz/index.php/category/ 
viva-projects/breathe/ 
11
www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/opinion/8386630/ 
Grace-chaos-in-urban-village-designs 
12
http://bustler.net/news/3115/winner-of- 
the-christchurch-breathe-the-new-urban-village-
project-competition 
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into one title. This allowed integrated designs to 
be developed for the whole site, so an attractive 
and liveable balance of public space and private 
space, and of medium-density townhouse-style 
dwellings and higher density apartment blocks 
could be achieved.  
4.1 Price, value and condition of the land  
A clear aim of the competition organisers was 
to encourage the development of a replicable 
winning package that would provide a viable 
market template for other developers.  This focus 
on an immediately replicable market solution 
meant that a conscious choice was made to have 
no long-term investment in the project from the 
Crown, or any of the other forms of financial 
sweetener found in other regeneration projects 
locally or internationally. It was made clear in the 
initial information about the competition that the 
Government was not planning to support the 
demonstration project financially, and wanted to 
recoup all the costs it incurred in buying the land 
and running the competition. However, how 
quickly it wanted its money back and how much it 
wanted back did not become clear until some 
months into the second stage of the competition.  
In the initial competition pack, it was made 
clear that the winning entry was to deliver ‘a 
return to the Government to cover, as a 
minimum, the direct capital costs of facilitating 
this project’ (p.33). It is not yet publicly known 
how much the Government paid to purchase the 
block of land for the Breathe Village, but the 
decision to identify a specific block of land in the 
Blueprint for the Residential Demonstration 
Project before the Crown had ownership of the 
land would have inevitably placed the 
government in a weaker position when 
negotiating to buy the ten parcels of land making 
up the block. The vendors would have known the 
Government needed to buy the land to fulfill its 
public commitments so were probably able to 
command an elevated price. The initial 
competition pack13 stated ’The land is being 
acquired by the Crown. The costs of acquisition 
are subject to negotiation by the present land 
owners and the Crown. Competitors are urged to 
concentrate in Stage 1 on the value of buildings 
and improvements and land values should be 
assumed as the registered land value. The actual 
land value will be introduced in Stage 2 of the 
                                                          
13
www.beaconpathway.co.nz/images/uploads/ 
Breathe_Competition_Information_Pack.PDF  
competition to provide for a full financial picture 
and potential support regarding the 
development’ (p.32). 
On 4th January 2013, in the final 10 days of 
Stage 1 of the competition, entrants were 
provided with a template spreadsheet to 
complete financial costings and this spreadsheet 
included a ’Notional land value (2007 land 
valuation)’ of $4,829,000. Entrants were 
expected to include this cost for the land in the 
feasibiity analysis that they submitted with their 
entry. Part way through Stage 2 of the 
competition the four finalists were sent a revised 
valuation of the block of land, dated 13 March 
2013, which had been commissioned by the 
Central City Development Unit. The instructions 
for this valuation were ’to establish the market 
value having regard to the Recovery Plan’ and 
placed the value of the land much higher, at 
$5,985,000 (Confidential Open market valuation 
for the project site, 27 March 2013). Finalists 
were given to understand that offers for the land 
were expected to be in this ballpark.  
The finalists queried the basis of this 
valuation. It was clarified that the new valuation 
had taken into account the higher amenity value 
that would in the future be provided by the East 
Frame, and the site’s location in the city and 
proximity to other planned new amenities.  And 
whilst this valuation occurred prior to a 
confirmed development layout for the East 
Frame,  ‘the likelihood that low rise residential 
development will occur along the eastern side of 
the Frame on Madras Street opposite the site 
was assumed’  (Breathe Stage 2 Competition 
Period – Questions & Answers, 6 June 2017). In 
other words, although developers were being 
asked to take the risk of being the first to start 
rebuilding in an area that was currently (and 
nearly 5 years later still is) a deserted wasteland, 
they were being asked to pay a price for the land 
which assumed all the potential developments 
around it had already happened. 
As the competition progressed, it also became 
clear that the land quality also presented 
challenges. The initial competition pack made no 
reference to the fact the land was liquefiable land 
classed Technical Category 3 (TC3), meaning that 
remediation or special foundations would be 
required. Initially the organisers were unwilling to 
provide the finalists with any more detailed 
information about the land, meaning that to do a 
realistic design with realistic costings, they would 
have each had to pay individually for their own 
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geotechnical analysis. However, eventually in 
June 2013 the organisers made available to all 
the finalists an initial geotech survey of the site 
provided by Tonkin and Taylor, which allowed the 
teams to make some assumptions about what 
style of foundation would be needed.  
At the end of Stage 2, one of the teams 
(Viva/Jasmax/Arcus Developments Ltd) informed 
the organisers that the information provided in 
Stage 2 about the higher price expected for the 
land and the physical constraints of the site had 
meant they had had to re-assess their design 
against the requirements to create a financially 
viable, sustainable and attractive living 
environment. ’This new information provided us 
with challenges we have been unable to solve… 
within the time constraints imposed by a 
competition … After many, many months of 
dedicated work… we had been unable to produce 
a design that is financially viable, yet still meets 
our goals of environmental and social 
sustainability’14. The high land price demanded by 
the Government thus proved a bridge too far for 
this team, and ultimately for the winner as well 
(see below). 
4.2 Evaluation criteria and resolving the tension 
between them 
Eight evaluation criteria were developed for 
the competition. These criteria encompassed 
both the very best in sustainable urban design 
and place making, alongside financial criteria 
aimed at ensuring the winning development 
provided a viable market template for other 
developers, as well as meeting a need for more 
affordable accommodation in the inner city.  
Three criteria related to the cost and financial 
feasibility of the proposal: 
o Viable – the development must be 
commercially feasible and support the 
local and regional economy. 
o Affordable – cater to the needs and 
budgets of a wide range of Christchurch 
residents. 
o Deliverable – design concepts can be 
practically delivered by teams with the 
necessary experience, skills and resources 
to complete the project. 
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 Letter from Arcus Developments Ltd and The Viva 
Project to the Judges of the New Urban Village 
Breathe Competition, 2 August 2013, about the 
Arcus/Viva/Jasmax submission at end of Stage 2. 
Five criteria were more design-oriented 
(though the innovation criteria could also apply 
to the financial aspects): 
o Liveable – meet current and future 
lifestyle needs of its residents, foster 
strong community connections through a 
balance of private and public spaces, and 
enhance the surrounding neighbourhood. 
o Sustainable – resource-efficient in 
design, construction and over the life of 
its use, and responsive to the local 
climate and ecology. 
o Enduring – promote excellence in 
earthquake-resilience, safe and healthy 
design, and be adaptable and enduring 
for generations to come. 
o Distinctive – the form and function of the 
development is well connected to, and 
enhances the local context, and provides 
a strong identity and sense of place. 
o Innovative – the best ideas are used and 
creatively enhanced to deliver 
exceptional 21st century Central City 
living. 
These criteria was explained in Stage 1 and 
further elaborated on in the Stage 2 Competition 
Briefing Document with a five page aspirational 
wish list summarising the very best standards in 
urban design, along with a desire for the 
development to be profitable, timely and deliver 
a return of its costs to the Government. 
Inevitably there was some conflict between 
the eight criteria. For example, the general 
housing market in New Zealand has not made 
much progress in resolving the tension between 
cost and high levels of energy efficiency. In their 
review of housing affordability in New Zealand, 
the Productivity Commission found that New 
Zealand residential construction costs are in the 
order of 15-25 percent higher than in Australia 
and that 80 percent of new dwellings are valued 
in the upper two quartiles of the total housing 
market, meaning that new housing is generally 
well beyond the reach of middle to lower-income 
households (New Zealand Productivity 
Commission, 2012). These factors (among others) 
contribute to New Zealand housing being by 
some measures ’the most unaffordable in the 
world’15. However, most new builds meet only 
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 Newshub report on The Economist article on global 
house prices 11 March 2017 
www.newshub.co.nz/home/money/2017/03/new-
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minimum building code standards of energy and 
water efficiency, standards that the OECD have 
noted are less stringent than those in many other 
OECD countries (OECD, 2017). For example, the 
Green Building Council notes that the R-values (a 
measure of heat loss from ceilings, walls and 
floors) specified in the Building Code are 50 
percent worse than many countries (Green 
Building Council, no date). Burgess (2011) 
concluded that new homes built to the Building 
Code standard could receive only 4 (out of a 
possible 10) stars on the HomestarTM rating 
scheme. Yet the competition was asking for 
designs which were both more affordable/better 
value for money, as well as more sustainable, 
accessible and liveable. 
The Stage 2 competition briefing document 
informed finalists that all these eight criteria 
were of equal weight. However the same 
document introduced additional financial criteria, 
effectively changing the weighting between the 
design-related criteria and the financial criteria. 
The Judge’s evaluation of each submission 
[against the original eight criteria] would now 
make up only 70% of the total score for the entry 
- the remaining marks would be allocated to the 
financial offer. The considerations in determining 
the mark for the financial offer were stated to be: 
risk allocated to organisers; value of the offer to 
the organisers; and acceptability of proposed 
variations to the Development Agreement’s 
terms and conditions16. The Government’s focus 
on recouping its costs and finding a model that 
could be picked up by other developers without 
any further financial input from Government was 
starting to outweigh the aspirational sustainable 
urban design criteria.   
The quality of a design inevitably has some 
connection to the cost of a development and 
hence its viability. In most large projects, this 
tension between quality and cost is addressed by 
a ‘value engineering’ stage after the initial 
quantity surveyor estimates have come in, when 
ways to increase the value of the project are 
considered (in this context, value is defined as 
function divided by cost17). This requires clarity 
on the function(s) the project is seeking to 
                                                                                          
zealand-housing-most-unaffordable-in-the-world-the-
economist.html  
16
www.beaconpathway.co.nz/images/uploads/ 
Breathe_Stage_2_Competition_Briefing_Document.PDF  
17
www.designingbuildings.co.uk/wiki/Value_engineeri
ng_in_building_design_and_construction  
deliver, and where, for example, the project is 
aiming to meet multiple criteria, which ones are 
the most important, and which may be 
compromised on to make the project more 
financially viable or to deliver better on other 
criteria. However, in the Breathe process this 
tension between quality and cost was not 
addressed. No guidance was provided to the 
finalists (or asked for) about how to prioritise the 
original eight criteria, and it was clear from the 
final submissions that the teams differed in which 
criteria they gave most weight to.  
The tension and ways to resolve it also 
appears not to have been considered by the 
judges in their own deliberations. In both Stage 1 
and Stage 2 of the design, the judging panel (with 
the exception of the developer Martin Udale) 
focused on the quality of the design, and a 
separate financial team (plus Udale) reviewed the 
financial criteria and the financial offers of the 
teams. 
4.3 Options to make the development viable 
In the Stage 1 competition brief, after 
indicating that the Government wanted at a 
minimum to get back the direct capital costs of 
the project, the text acknowledged the 
challenges of the  project and offered  to work 
with the chosen developer on  partnering 
opportunities to facilitate the development. ‘As 
part of the Stage 1 submission, the entrant will 
provide their ‘first thoughts’ on these 
opportunities as listed. The detail and final shape 
of the partnering opportunities will be developed 
during Stage 2’. (Breathe Competition 
Information Pack, 2012, p.33). This wording does 
suggest some openness to considering other 
‘other partnering opportunities’, but the 
statement about requiring the return of capital 
costs to the Government implied the 
‘partnership’, at least with the Crown, was 
unlikley to be financial.   
In the Stage 2 briefing document (p.7), the 
speed that the Government wanted its money 
back became clearer. While indicating teams 
could propose alternative options for how and 
when the land was paid for, it was stated that ’all 
entries will need to be converted to an equivalent 
NPV of ’cash price’ based on:  
 1% deposit on signing of Agreement  
 Final payment 23 months following site 
possession  
 Organisers will retain a lien on site until 
final payment’.  
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In other words, from the point of agreeing to 
build the village, the developer would be a debtor 
to the Crown - and also contractually obligated to 
deliver the village as designed by an agreed date. 
When it was pointed out by the finalists that a 
lien on the property would make it harder to 
secure other finance, the organisers simply 
replied ‘A lien or similar form of security 
(including a caveat or mortgage) over the land is 
normal commercial practice where a deferred 
payment is proposed.’ (Breathe Stage 2 
Competition Period – Questions & Answers, 
Issued: 7 June 2013). 
Despite the conflicting messages here, finalists 
did try to present other options to the organisers. 
The following are some of the options put to the 
organisers by the finalists: 
 
-   Government to remediate the land 
before selling it to the winner.  
-   Government to partner in the 
development, rather than simply selling 
the land to the developer with conditions.  
Recognising that CERA was unlikely to 
want to take on any risk of loss in the 
development, its role in the partnership 
could be to put the land in at (initially) no 
cost, and then to take a profit share out 
of the development – i.e., the purchase 
price for the land from CERA would be 
calculated as a profit share, and not 
payable until the end of the development.  
-   Ganellen proposed a ‘Build, Operate, 
Transfer’ model with a government-
secured loan to finance construction and 
delivery. The village they proposed was 
aimed at the rental market (primarily 
targeting students and the temporary 
workforce in the city during the rebuild), 
with Ganellen providing asset 
management for 20 years giving an 
annual return to the Government with 
this asset  passed to government at the 
end of 20 years (King, 2014, p.413). In the 
final stages of the competition, Ganellen 
was invited back to the table to negotiate 
with the Government, but ’asked to 
modify their bid into a more conventional 
form. They ultimately refused the 
opportunity, believing that their proposed 
development model was the right one’ 
(King, 2014, p.415). 
-   Jasmax/Viva’s Stage 1 entry proposed a 
$2m ’first start’ incentive payment in 
recognition of risk taken by first 
rebuilders in a currently derelict 
abandoned area and the value of the 
project to the wider city in kickstarting 
repopulation of eastern side of city. 
-   establish an Inner City Council Controlled 
Organisation that was then given 
ownership of land. The land could then 
have been made available for long-term 
lease on modest terms to residents, which 
would have meant that the primary cost 
for purchasers was the cost of the 
dwellings. 
None of these options were accepted. The 
organisers believed it was up to the private sector 
to both take the risk and reap the profits of 
stimulating residential developments in the inner 
city. Their focus on a replicable market solution 
without any longer term financial input from the 
central or local government meant that 
throughout the final negotiations with the four 
finalists, the Government maintained a focus on 
short-term market return (and arguably was 
seeking better-than market-returns to cover the 
fact it had paid more than market rates for the 
land).  
It seems strange that the Government 
adopted this market only approach for a project 
aimed at revitalising Christchurch after a major 
earthquake, when the same year (2012) it had 
joined with Auckland Council to create the 
Tamaki Redevelopment Company to lead the 
regeneration of the Tamaki area over the next 
15-25 years18, indicating an acceptance of a 
government role in regeneration in the Auckland 
context. Given that in its Central City Recovery 
Plan of December 2011, CCC indicated its 
willingness to lead the regeneration and play the 
role of patient capital, it is curious to speculate 
whether the outcome may have been different if 
CCC, rather than CERA, had been the purchaser of 
the land negotiating with the finalists.  
More recently, the need for local and/or 
central government involvement in urban 
regeneration appears to have become more 
widely accepted in New Zealand. Council-owned 
regeneration vehicles have been created in 
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www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/briefings/2013-
housing/11.htm, 
www.tamakiregeneration.co.nz/regeneration/our-
community/news/urban-redevelopment-company-
transform-tāmaki  
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Auckland (Panuku Development Auckland19) and 
Christchurch (Development Christchurch20) and 
approved for Wellington21, and in February 2017, 
the Government began consultation on proposed 
new Urban Development Authority legislation to 
enable publicly-controlled urban development 
authorities to access powers to acquire parcels of 
land and then plan and oversee the necessary 
development (New Zealand Government, 2017). 
4.4 The Outcome 
Almost until the project fell over, it was hailed 
as a success. The residential chapter of the 
Recovery Plan, published in July 2014, stated: 
‘The competition winning design was created by 
a team of international designers who partnered 
with a Canterbury construction firm. The winning 
entry demonstrated how high quality medium 
density housing can be delivered in Christchurch. 
The design showcases a well-balanced blend of 
style and quality with a range of innovative 
features, such as the use of the LVL timber 
system developed by the University of 
Canterbury, and the new Armadillo™ Foundation 
System developed by the team themselves’. 
Beacon Pathway provided a lot of practical advice 
during the competition and around 2014 
developed a ‘Toolkit for Residential Design and 
Build Competitions’ which it has made available 
on its website22 so others could benefit from its 
experience of running what (at that stage) it 
clearly assumed to be a successful competition.  
The winning team had indicated in October 
2013 that the development would be underway 
by April 2014, but, by June 2015 construction still 
had not begun and their developer, Ian Smart, 
had not yet applied for building consents23.  
Interviewed in July 2015, Gerry Brownlee, the 
Minister for Earthquake Recovery, effectively 
wiped his hands of the project saying that he 
thought the urban village ‘should never have 
started in the first place…I think it's going to 
struggle to get off the ground ‘... I'm very 
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 www.panuku.co.nz  
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 https://dcl.org.nz/  
21
http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/77708402/ 
Urban-development-agency-idea-gets-green-light-
from-Wellington-city-councillors  
22
www.beaconpathway.co.nz/further-research/ 
article/a_toolkit_for_residential_design_and_build_co
mpetitions  
23
www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/business/the-rebuild/ 
69432838/Christchurchs-Breathe-Urban-Village-
delayed 
disappointed that people who said they would do 
something are not going to do it’24.  Further, The 
Press (3 July 2015) reported the Minister saying 
he was ‘probably going to get in trouble’ for 
giving his personal opinion, but it was frustrating 
to ‘take the flak’ for the project's delays when the 
people behind it did not deliver what they 
promised. He also said the project had ’nothing 
to do’ with the Government and was the 
developer's responsibility’. 
It appears the Minister’s comments 
undermined the winning team’s final chance to 
secure the additional financing needed to meet 
the elevated land price required by the 
Government. Following a request from Stuff in 
December 201525, documents released under the 
Official Information Act in July 201626 showed 
that two Chinese companies and an Italian 
regional government were among the project’s 
potential funders, but that the Chinese backer 
pulled out after Brownlee’s comments were 
aired. The Treasury insisted on CERA being paid 
$5.1m for the earthquake damaged land, and Ian 
Smart (the developer in the winning team) could 
not find any valuation that matched that26. As a 
result he was unable to secure finance that would 
allow paying any more than around $4.7m for the 
land, and Treasury refused to allow CERA to part 
with it for less than $5.1m. In November 2015, 
CERA announced that the development would 
not proceed.  
The Minister for Canterbury Earthquake 
Recovery was unrepentant. When interviewed in 
July 2016, Gerry Brownlee said the Government 
did not want to buy up land and sell it at discount 
prices. ‘You don’t preserve land prices by doing 
that and [CERA] wasn’t a charity’26. He was either 
unaware or unconcerned that the elevated land 
prices were one of the key factors inhibiting the 
residential developments needed to bring people 
back into the city, and so delaying the city’s 
recovery. 
In response, Ian Smart stated that the failed 
project had cost him hundreds of thousands of 
dollars26. However his was not the only team to 
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www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/business/the-
rebuild/69935284/Recovery-Minister-Gerry-Brownlee-
slates-Breathe-Urban-Village  The Press 3 July 2015 
25
www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/business/the-rebuild/ 
75334172/Scrapped-Breathe-competition-a-waste-of-
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26
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project  
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put in enormous time and resources into this 
project. Extrapolating from estimates of costs at 
each stage for the four finalists, it seems likely 
the 58 multi-disciplinary teams of entrants each 
spent $20,000-40,000 in professional time in 
developing their concept plans, and each of the 
four teams of finalists a further $50,000-$60,000 
preparing detailed plans, giving a total of roughly 
$2 million of professional time between them, 
not to mention many hours of community time. If 
none of these village designs are built, then all 
this effort and international goodwill towards 
helping breathe life into the city has been 
wasted. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The potential benefits to the inner city’s 
recovery of an early kickstart of residential 
development were significant. However central 
government was unwilling or unable to recognize 
that an insistence on a pure market approach 
would not deliver the innovative sustainable 
village asked for in the competition brief. This 
level of naïve neoliberal faith that the markets 
could deliver urban regeneration to a badly 
damaged city was not seen even in Margaret 
Thatcher’s Britain, or in the decades since 
(Roberts, 2017; Berkley et al. 2017).  In the UK, 
public sector funding was central to most urban 
regeneration efforts in the 1970s and 1980s. As a 
result, the evolving debate there has not been 
about whether public money should be involved, 
but about how to make better use of public funds 
to leverage private investment, how to foster the 
formation of public-private partnerships, and why 
it was important to increase local government 
and community involvement (Berkley et al. 2017, 
Roberts, 2017).  
International experience would suggest that 
the sheer scale of the area of empty city land in 
the Christchurch inner city presents a significant 
‘first mover’ disadvantage and high risk to the 
first developer seeking to turn an empty 
wasteland into a vibrant community. However, if 
such a project were successful, there would be 
significant benefits to the city and wider 
community, so a contribution of local or central 
government money would have been entirely 
appropriate. There are many ways such 
contributions can be made. Options include tax 
incentives, contribution of land (by gift or lease), 
subsidies for land costs or land value write-
downs, loans for land purchase and/or 
construction, site assembly, site remediation, 
additional density or height allowances, 
development contributions rebate, new 
infrastructure for transportation and facilities, 
open space and landscape beautification, and a 
home buyers assistance incentives (Meyer and 
Lyons, 2000; Kriken, 2010; CCRP, 2011; Raf Manji, 
pers.comm.).  
In return for their subsidies, local or central 
governments or development agencies often 
seek to dictate, or at least influence, the type of 
use to which the site will be put (Meyer & Lyons, 
2000). In the Breathe case, the Government 
wanted to dictate the site’s use without making 
any financial contribution. The Government did 
indicate that no district plan rules would apply for 
the site, and has subsequently funded nearby 
amenities - the nearby Margaret Mahy 
Playground which opened in December 201527 , 
and a park and paved areas through the centre of 
the nearby East Frame due for completion in 
early 201828 . However, at the time of the 
competition and for that specific site, the only 
contribution made by the Government to reduce 
financial risk for the developer was to consolidate 
the site into one title. In return, it wanted a 
developer to take on all the first mover risk 
themselves, to pay the Government an elevated 
price for a liquefaction-prone piece of land, and 
then to enter a contract to deliver an agreed 
development on the land by an agreed date, 
therefore tying the developer’s hand on what it 
did on that site. 
When assessing a range of ‘patient capital’ 
options put to it by the finalists and the request 
by the finalists for a more reasonable valuation of 
the land, the Government failed to factor in the 
opportunity cost to itself, and to local 
government, local businesses and the wider 
Christchurch community of delaying by many 
years the residential development of the eastern 
side of the city. As a result, the development 
failed to eventuate. Five years since the initiation 
of the Breathe competition and seven years since 
the first earthquake, the city block designated for 
the Breathe village and a further 10 city blocks to 
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the west and south of the site remain empty and 
deserted. For want of a little patience about 
when and how it got its financial return, the early 
vision of the vitality that a thriving residential 
neighbourhood would bring to the city has not 
yet been realised.  
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